"The liberation movements were not acting in good faith. They were in the Agreement fundamentally to have a legal basis to end the Portuguese presence in the governance of Angola," Pezarat Correia said in an interview with Lusa.
Generals Pezarat Correia, 92, and António Gonçalves Ribeiro, 91, are the only living members of the Portuguese delegation that negotiated the Alvor Agreement with the leaders of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA, Agostinho Neto), National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA, Holden Roberto) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA, Jonas Savimbi) aiming for the independence of the former colony.
The fact that Angola was an important pawn in the game of the superpowers in the context of the Cold War, which was then taking place, conditioned compliance with the Alvor Agreement and, according to Pezarat Correia, everything that "subsequently happened and which came to dictate the emptying "of the agreement and forced the then President of the Portuguese Republic, Francisco Costa Gomes, to declare the expiration of the negotiated instrument.
"One exception remained, which was the maintenance of the date of independence. Everything else in the text was overtaken by the circumstances themselves. In any case, 50 years ago, (...) I was frankly satisfied with the Agreement and even left with some hope that the solution was there", he argued.
The circumstances to which he refers, which were not taken into account 50 years ago and which led to the "failure of the Alvor Agreement", were the structure of the transitional government and the constitution of the mixed military forces.
The transitional government, with 12 ministries, envisaged that each of the four signatory parties would be responsible for three portfolios.
The three Portuguese ministers would have three secretaries of state, representing each of the liberation movements.
The remaining nine ministries, headed in equal numbers by MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, would have a Secretary of State from the two remaining movements.
"This was clearly a mix. It wasn't even a coalition government. It was a mix so that all movements were represented in all departments. This government could only function in good faith, if there was good faith on the part of its members, because what happened is that, afterwards, each of the representatives of the liberation movements, in each of the departments, was only there to disrupt the life of the respective minister", he considered.
"It was a fundamental aspect that revealed, let's say, the lack of good faith of the three movements," he argued.
The other circumstance, which Pezarat Correia considers to have been "the real failure of the Alvor Agreement", was the failure to form mixed military forces, which should have had 48 thousand troops, half of which would be Portuguese soldiers and the remaining 24 thousand would be provided by equal parts by MPLA, FNLA and UNITA.
"It was essential to find a military solution that would guarantee that, during the transition period, this ceasefire situation would be maintained. The instrument that was thought of, and ultimately agreed with the liberation movements, was the creation of mixed military forces", he recalled.
Portugal did its part, reducing troops, making some return to the country and demobilizing the Angolan soldiers that it had in its ranks. On the other hand, the opposite happened with the liberation movements.
In other words, while Portugal "had to withdraw its troops, the liberation movements had to reinforce themselves to reach 8 thousand men" and "attracted to themselves the soldiers that Portugal, in the meantime, was demobilizing".
"They were people who already had military experience and the liberation movements, according to the ethnic influence they had in those regions, found important recruitment bases there. Well, that was understandable. But what the liberation movements didn't do was then contribute their troops to the mixed military forces. And the mixed military forces ended up never being formed", he lamented.
As the Alvor Agreement provided, "the mixed military forces should be responsible for internal security and border security, preventing external interventions. What ended up happening is that the liberation movements not only did not contribute their forces to the mixed military forces, as they reinforced their troops beyond the eight thousand men that each one was responsible for, and the conflict between them resumed".
Portugal found itself unable to maintain military control over the entire Angolan territory, with the aggravating factor that "each of the movements tried to obtain external support that violated the borders", contrary to what the agreement stated.
"This was a total violation of the Alvor Agreement," he added.
As for criticisms of Portugal having been in a hurry to decolonize Angola, Pezarat Correia refutes them.
"The longer independence was delayed, the worse it was for Portugal. The accusations that were made later, that Portugal was too hasty, are completely meaningless. At the time, it had no possibility of maintaining control of the situation. On top of that, it began to then the problem of Timor also arose, which came at the same time", he highlighted.
Without mixed military forces and with each liberation movement applying its strategy, the way was opened for external interference.
"The first neighbor to interfere in the interior of Angola, even before independence, was Zaire [current Democratic Republic of Congo]. In fact, the forces of Zaire were confused with the forces of the FNLA. Then it was South Africa. In fact, South Africa, which was already inside Angola before April 25, already had its base in Cuito Cuanavale and then began to deploy its forces, let's say, on its own, and then in agreement with UNITA", he detailed.
"And then it was Cuba that came, with logistical support from the Soviet Union. Cuba crossed the Atlantic and came to support the MPLA and was the one that ended up saving the MPLA on November 11 [when Agostinho Neto declared Angola's independence]", he stressed.
"Things didn't go as we had thought, but that almost always happens. Today, we look at international conflicts and see that agreements are respected, right?" he asked.